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TORTS-STRICT LIABILITY FOR SERVICES
CHEVRON v. SUTTON

Plaintiff Sutton brought suit for wrongful death against
the
petitioner, Chevron Oil Company, service station lessee Lee
Sharp
and Sharp's employee, Herbert R. Buss. Sutton's wife died as a result
of injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred
when
a wheel that Buss had repaired came off the auto. The District
court
granted Chevron's motion for a summary judgment. On appeal
to the
Court of Appeals, the summary judgment was reversed. One of
the
grounds for its decision was that the theory of strict liability
was
applicable:
We hold that Chevron is strictly liable for the torts of Sharp and
Buss regardless of the legal relationship created by Chevron. This
responsibility is placed on Chevron for the protection of the motoring public who consumes the product or uses the services of the
station operator.'
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded
the cause to the District court for action consistent with its opinion
that, depending on the facts, Chevron might be liable on two possible
theories, neither of them being strict liability:
One of the grounds upon which the Court of Appeals based its
decision was that of strict liability. We discussed this doctrine at
length in Stang v. Hertz Corporation, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732
(1972). Nothing we said in our decision in that case can properly be
enlarged or extended to embrace the factual situation here.2
On June 15, 1968, Standard Oil Company, the lessor, leased the
service station and premises to Leland A. Sharp. On the same
day,
Standard Oil Co., as a seller, entered into a "sales agreement"
with
Sharp as "buyer," in which Standard agreed to sell and deliver
gasoline, motor fuel, lubrication oil and petroleum products to Sharp,
and Sharp agreed to purchase and sell. Should any of these parties
be
held liable for the sale of a defective service? To answer that question
we must understand the history of the development of the
strict
liability concept to further aid us in the analysis of strict liability
1. Sutton v. Chevron Oil Co., 85 N.M. 604, 514 P.2d 1301 (1973).
2. Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton, 85 N.M. 679, 515 P.2d 1283 (1973).
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may be expected to cause physical harm to the consumer or his
6
property.
The courts have not allowed the expansion of the strict liability
concept to persons rendering either professional or nonprofessional
services, 7 but this disallowance has not been applied where defendant rendered ultrahazardous services8 or where the transaction was
in part a sale and in part the furnishing of services. 9 The expansion
of the scope of strict liability with regard to services can be shown by
the decisions in cases involving beauty parlors, one of the most widespread service industries in the United States.
Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., supra, involved the liability of a
beauty parlor operator for injury to a patron's hair and scalp resulting from a product used in giving a permanent wave. Alluding to
Magrine v. Krasnica, the court stated:
Defendants claim that to hold them to strict liability would be contrary to Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A2d 539 (Cty.
Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223,
241, A2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd 53 N.J. 259, 250 A2d 129
(1969). We cannot agree. Magrine, a patient of the defendantdentist, was injured when a hypodermic needle being used, concededly with due care, to administer a local anesthetic broke off in
his gum or jaw. The parties agreed that the break resulted from a
latent defect in the needle. It was held that the strict liability in tort
doctrine was not applicable to the professional man, such as a dentist, because the essence of the relationship with his patient was the
furnishing of professional skill and services. We accepted the view
that a dentist's bill for services should be considered as representing
pay for that alone. The use of instruments, or the administration of
medicines or the providing of medicines for the patient's home consumption cannot give the ministrations the cast of a commercial
transaction. Accordingly the liability of the dentist in cases involving
6. Id. at 804.
7. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super 228, 227, A.2d 539, affd sub nom Magrine v.
Spector, 100 N.J. Super 223, 241 A.2d 637, affd without op. 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129
(dentist not liable for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff when, because of defect,
hypodermic needle broke off in plaintiff's gum); Barbee v. Rogers (Tex) 125 S.W.3d 342
(optometrist not strictly liable for improper fitting of contact lenses); La Rossa v. Scientific
Design Co. (1968, Ch 3 N.J.) 402 F.2d 937, 29 A.L.R.3d 1416 (strict liability held inapplicable to services rendered by an engineering company in the construction of a chemical
plant); Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Service Co. (1967, Alaska, 427 P.2d 833
(strict liability not applicable to one who rendered boiler repair services).
8. Luthringer v. Moore 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d (1948).
9. A beauty parlor operator administering treatment with a defective product may be
held strictly liable for injuries to a customer. Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc. 54 N.J. 585, 258
A.2d 697 (1969) (where court considered the treatment both a service and a sale of the
defective product).
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infallibility is that of the major companies who finance
and many
times control these stations;' 2 and (7) the stations
are sellers of
property in the accepted reasonable sense of the term.
In another line of cases involving hospitals, strict liability
has been
held not applicable in certain situations and applicable in
other situations. In Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center,' '
strict tort or
warranty liability was found inapplicable to the transfusion
of incompatible blood. In so holding the court provided:
Whatever may be the final policy decision to be reached in cases
involving blood infected with viral hepatitis, we find no justification
for extending the doctrine of strict liability to a case such as
this
where the blood is not infected or defective.
To adopt such a rule would be to make a hospital an insurer of what
are in essence medical services and opinions, the cross-matching and
typing of blood. In our view, the same policy considerations which
led the court in Newmark v. Gimbel's, Incorporated, 54 N.J. 585,
596-597, 258 A2d 697 (1969), to hold that the rules of strict liability in tort and implied warranty should not be imposed on dentists
and doctors, apply to the services rendered by defendant hospital
in
this case. The obligation of hospital in cross-matching and typing
blood in cases of blood tranfusions should continue to be as it
is
now, grounded and expressed in a duty to exercise reasonable competence and care. (emphasis supplied)
The same distinctions made by Newmark apply here, and,
again we
can distinguish the transfusion of blood from the servicing
of an
automobile in like manner. Much seems to hinge on the
difficulty of

12. Sutton v. Chevron Oil Co., 85 N.M. 604, 514 P.2d 1301
(1973) where the facts
included that:
Prior to authorizing Chevron and Sharp to repair his Toyota,
Sutton relied on
statements made to him that Chevron had more skillful repairmen,
was superior, and specialized in servicing and repair work on vehicles
of his kind, the
Toyota; that Sharp and Buss were agents and employees of
Chevron. In addition to signs, uniforms, credit cards and credit privileges,
Sutton relied on
Chevron advertising in the classified section of the Albuquerque
telephone
directory. Here, Chevron states:
At the Sign of the Chevron, we take better care of your car with
famous
Chevron Gasolines and Motor Oils. Also Atlas Tires, Batteries,
and
Accessories sold on the Chevron Easy-Payment Plan.
"WHERE TO GET SERVICE"
Dealers (Emphasis added)
Below are listed a large number of Chevron service
station operations among
which are included those which perform auto repairs, tune-ups,
brakes, American and foreign car repair, and other forms of service.
It advertises "A
Mechanic on Duty." This advertising can lead the public to
believe Chevron
exercises control over its service stations; also, Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co., 168
Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd on rehearing, 168 Wash. 465,
15 P.2d 1118
(1932), where the seller's strict liability was enlarged by
express representations.
13. 109 N.J. Super 217, 262 A.2d 902, 906-907 (1970).
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analyzing and diagnosing the ailments of a human being. The variables one deals with in analyzing an automobile are not as complex
as the variables dealt with in analyzing a human being.
However, even in blood transfusion cases, it has been held that a
hospital can be strictly liable where the patient contracted serum
hepatitis from transfused blood. The court held in Cunningham v.
14
MacNeal Memorial Hospital that:
The question before court was whether doctrine of strict tort liability applied in cases where plaintiff allegedly contracts serum hepatitis from transfused blood; court noted that basis of strict liability,
even in earliest unwholesome food cases, was not implied warranty
but public policy, and rejected defense contentions that blood was
not a product and was not subject of a sale, citing numerous cases,
including Russell, N 7 supra in text; court stated:
We believe it is realistic and reasonable to hold that a sale is involved
in the transaction whereby the patient comes into possession of
blood. On oral argument in the case before us counsel for the hospital stated that a sale was not involved; that rather, there was an
exchange of personal property for remuneration. That is an attempt
to make a distinction without a difference. We agree with the
opinion in Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., supra, that to
take a sale and twist into a service is a distortion.
Here the court is probably looking at a much more clear situation
involving the control of the blood received by the hospital. When the
blood is pure there is no way to tell how the deaths or complications
occurred. When the blood is infected, one can tell very easily and be
reasonably accurate in attaching the blame to the tranfusion. In
Brody v. Overlook Hospital,1 a 1972 case, the court held:
Both a hospital and a blood bank could be liable to widow of deceased who was given blood which caused serum hepatitis. "The
imposition of strict liability is predicated, not upon fault, but upon
physical control over the defective product at a time when the product is in fact defective." The court also stated: "Since hospitals
patronize the bank charging the lowest fee, there will be greater
demand for blood from the bank with the better safety record. The
incidence of hepatitis infection must thus be reduced."
With an auto part, someone in the "chain" has very good control
over the variables that determine the effectiveness of the repair.
14. Personal Injury, Actions, Defenses, Damages, Vol. 4B, Supplement, p. 20, Matthew
Bender, referring to Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital at 113 Il. App. 2d 74, 251
N.E.2d 733 (1969).
15. 296 A.2d 668 (N.J. Super 1972); See also Jackson v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 8
Wash. 83, 505 P.2d 139 (1972), on the issue of "control."
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Again, establishments such as service stations are commercial enterprises, the product or service involved is fully visible and capable of
being checked for defects. It is safe to say that a "sale" is involved
any time mechanical services are performed.
From the history of strict liability throughout the United States
we saw that it was adopted to meet changing conditions in the
economy. Perhaps the law at times has lagged behind these changes,
rather than preceding or arising concurrently, but public policy
demands forced it to adjust. A need appeared, as in the "food sale"
abuses; and the law responded. An example of this process in New
Mexico came about in the leasing area, where it was impossible to
meet public policy demands in favor of teaching lessors because of
the intermediate lessee. The law responded and made the lessor
strictly liable:
We feel that the conditions and the needs of the times make it
appropriate for the changes as we are here making. Most of the states
who have adopted strict liability have done so through the judicial
system. 1 6
This leaves us at the frontier of deciding whether it is appropriate
to extend the doctrine of strict liability to the area of services. Not
only must the use of the strict liability doctrine in particular situations appear sound from a hypothetical viewpoint, but the appropriate fact situation must arise for the courts to initially extend the
doctrine and be able to forecast the possible ramifications of that
extension.
The amount and increase of service employment in New Mexico' 7
16. Stang v. Hertz, 83 N.M. 730, 735 P.2d 732 (1972).
17. New Mexico Estimated Civilian Work Force, Unemployment, and Employment,
"New Mexico Bureau of Labor Statistics" shows that the number of employees engaged in
manufacturing increased from 16,700 to 21,300 from 1960 to 1971 which is an increase of
27.5%. The increase from 1960 to 1971 of service employees was 49,400 to 62,400, an
incrase of 26.3%. Furthermore, manufacturing has accounted for approximately 7% of total
non-agricultural employment while services have accounted for about 21% of non-agricultural employment.
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and throughout the United States' 8 is indication enough that the
sheer volume of possible service-torts must have increased over the
years, with a corresponding increase in litigation. In New Mexico for
September 1, 1973, the number of employees engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of auto dealers and service stations alone accounted for approximately 16.0% of total retail and wholesale
trade.' 9 If strict liability were to include all retail and wholesale
establishments, it would account for 22.0% of total non-agricultural
employment, 2" while total manufacturing would account for 8.3%
of total non-agricultural employment. 2" There is a greater need to
simplify litigation in New Mexico, where services are predominant,
than in many other states where manufacturing is a much greater
proportion of the economic activity. Yet other states have used the
strict liability concept to a much greater extent,2 2 at least prior to
the Court of Appeals' decision in Chevron v. Sutton. 3
The Supreme Court of New Mexico set forth the historical development of strict liability in tort as applied to products liability cases
18. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Establishment Data- Historical Employment-Employees on non-agricultural payrolls by industry division, shows that the number
of employees in manufacturing increased 17.8% from 1960 to 1968. The increase from
1960 to 1968 of service employees was 23.6%. Furthermore, manufacturing has accounted
for approximately 30% of non-agricultural employment while service employment has
accounted for approximately 21% of total non-agricultural employment.
U.S.
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Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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New Mexico Estimated Civilian Work Force, Unemployment, Employment, "New Mexico
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
22. Prosser, supra note 5, at 794-798.
23. Sutton v. Chevron, 85 N.M. 604, 514 P.2d 1301 (1973).
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and extended the doctrine to the lessor of an automobile in Stang v.
Hertz Corporation.24 In extending strict liability to lessors, the
Court said:
It is apparent from a reading of the Restatement, and the leading
cases on this subject, that the doctrine of strict liability was evolved
to place liability on the party primarily responsible for the injury
occurring, that is, the manufacturer of the defective product. This is
based on reasons of public policy. Inherent in these policy considerations is not the nature of the transaction by which the consumer
obtained possession of the defective product, but the character of the
defect itself; that is, one occurring in the manufacturing process and
the unavailability of an adequate remedy on behalf of the injured
plaintiff. For this reason, I find no logical basis for differentiating
between the liability to an injured consumer of a dealer who is in the
business of selling an automobile which is in a defective condition
because of the manufacture thereof,
and a dealer who is in the
25
business of leasing the automobile.
One justification for strict liability has been said to be that the
seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
assumed a special responsibility toward all members of the consuming public who may be injured by it. The public has the right to and
does expect that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods. Public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production. 2 6 The consumer is
entitled to a maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and
the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.2 7
There is no difference in principle between a lessor of cars and a
service station that performs repairs faultily, thereby exposing the
public to the same quantum of potential harm as a defectively produced or leased auto.
24. Stang v. Hertz, 83 N.M. 730, 497, P.2d 732 (1972).
25. Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32. 467 P.2d 256, (1970).
26. It should be noted that strict liability covers not only specific damages such as
medical expenses and lost income, but can also cover the less easily quanitified item of pain
and suffering. Franklin, 24, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, Stan.
L.R. 439 (1972).
27. A bailor for hire, such as a person in the U-drive-it business, puts motor vehicles in
the stream of commerce in a fashion not unlike a manufacturer or retailer. * ** The very
nature of the business is such that the bailee, his employees, passengers and the traveling
public are exposed to a greater quantum of potential danger of harm from defective vehicles
than usually arises out of sales by the manufacturer. We held in Santor the liability of the
manufacturer might be expressed in terms of strict liability in tort. Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52 66-67, 207 A.2d 305; * * * By analogy the same rule should be
made applicable to the U-drive-it bailor-bailee relationship. Such a rental must be regarded
as accompanied by a representation that the vehicle is fit for operation on the public
highways.
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What would be the practical result as far as service establishments
such as gas stations are concerned if the concept of strict liability
were expanded in New Mexico? Putting it in the scope of the free
market system, Chevron and other companies might react, at worst,
by disallowing stations to perform certain repairs. This policy would
cause marginal stations to close, since they supplement their income
through repair work in order to survive. However, one of the ideas
behind strict liability is to eliminate processes which operate at
"below par" standards or at least force improvement of standards.
With the abundance of service stations already operating, the elimination of those operating "below par" would probably be negligible
and the entry by those who could maintain adequate standards
would soon replace those eliminated. This can be described as a
resource allocation justification. 2 8
Why did the Supreme Court reject the opportunity to utilize the
concept of strict liability in Chevron v. Sutton? It has been said that
the adoption of the doctrine of strict liability appears likely to involve a change in theory more than a change in the results which are
reached under other theories of products liability 2 9 The reversal and
remanding of Sutton v. Chevron, supra, to the District court will
probably result in the same verdict that was reached by the New
Mexico Court of Appeals using strict liability. However, the District
court will most likely depend on apparent authority and agency by
estoppel doctrines. The result is the use of much more time, money,
and more complicated procedures3" than would have been used had
the District court in the initial proceedings relied on the strict liability doctrine, or had the litigation terminated at the Court of Appeals
level where strict liability was adopted. The courts of New Mexico
could reach similar decisions in the much more simple manner.
Utilizing the definition of strict liability in the Restatement of
Torts3
2nd that was used for the New Mexico Appellate Court's
28. Consumers should be informed of the true costs of products in the marketplace, and
the price charged by the producer should include not only the costs of labor and materials,
but the social costs of the product as well. If social costs are not reflected in price, then
there will be excessive demand for underpriced products and the overall allocation of
resources throughout society will be distorted. In defective-product of service cases, this
argument would require that if two products or services appear similar in function and cost
of repair or manufacture, but onecauses users or bystanders many more personal injuries,
their prices would reflect this differential so that consumers can be aware of the actual
social costs of the products. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a
Proposal,24 Stan. L Rev. (1972).
29. Prosser, supra note 5, at 804.
30. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1123-1124 (1960).
31. Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 402A, Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
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adoption of the strict liability doctrine in Chevron v. Sutton, supra,
and subsequent cases expanding the concept of strict liability, it is
evident that the expansion of this theory to encompass services is
feasible. Furthermore Chevron v. Sutton provides a fact situation
which lends itself to the use of the strict liability theory in the area
of services. It is no longer logical to restrict § 402A to products. In
enunciating the general concept of strict liability, the courts have
stripped away the vestigal remnants which rendered the warranty
action so cumbersome and inadequate, and have restored simplicity
and attention to substance (rather than form) in the field of products
liability. Why not extend the theory to nonprofessional services,
especially when the sale of a product is involved?
TITO D. CHAVEZ

or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his propety, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.

